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Abstract
Dominant intermediaries are a defining feature of the modern economy. This paper
studies the mechanisms that give rise to trading networks with a dominant intermedi-
ary.
Trades between actors require a direct link or a path that involves intermediaries.
Links are costly. Efficiency therefore pushes towards connected networks with few
links: this set includes the hub-spoke network, the cycle network and their variants.
The hub-spoke network exhibits extreme inequality, while the cycle network yields
equal payoffs for all traders.
We conduct a large scale experiment on link formation among traders; the game
takes place in continuous time and allows for asynchronous choices. The main find-
ing is that the pricing protocol – the rule dividing the surplus between traders and
intermediaries – determines which of these two networks arises.
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1 Introduction
Intermediaries are a prominent feature of the modern economy: they are a defining feature
of banking, retail, and information services. At a high level, an intermediary may be seen
as facilitating valuable exchanges between economic actors. So intermediaries may be seen
as lowering costs of exchange or reducing frictions inherent in an economic transaction.
The intermediation role has a reinforcing aspect: the more actors use an intermediary, the
more attractive it becomes for other actors to use. This economic pressure gives rise to
highly visible globally dominant intermediaries, who acquire great market power and earn
enormous revenues. The goal of the present paper is to better understand the mechanisms
underlying the emergence of such dominant intermediaries.
Networks represent a natural way to reason about the process of intermediation. Trades
between two actors can be realized if they have a direct link or if they are indirectly linked
through a chain of intermediaries.1 The key point to bear in mind is that these links
are costly to maintain. For concreteness, consider a network with n actors in which all
pairs are linked (the complete network). In this setting, every bilateral exchange involves
direct trading: there is no intermediation. However, there are n(n− 1)/2 links formed. By
contrast, consider the hub-spoke network: in this setting all the exchanges involving pairs
of spokes – i.e., (n− 1)(n− 2)/2 pairs – entail intermediation (and possibly large rents for
the hub). This is accompanied by a large saving in costs of links, as the hub-spoke network
contains only n−1 links.2 More generally, a network may be sparse and connected without
concentration of intermediation power. An instance of such a network is a cycle containing
all actors: in this setting, there are only n links and as everyone is symmetrically located,
every actor will earn an equal payoff. So the cycle reconciles efficiency and equity. The goal
of the paper is to examine circumstances that give rise to hub-spoke networks as against
sparse networks with one or more cycles.
The paper considers a network formation model taken from Goyal and Vega-Redondo
[2007]: individuals choose to form links with each other and then use the network con-
structed to engage in exchange. If an actor maintains links with many others, she incurs
large linking costs but she will be able to appropriate a fair share of the surplus generated
by the exchanges. If on the other hand she maintains few links then her linking costs will be
1The links may embody trust relations, reflect communication channels, or simply reflect physical in-
frastructure (such as train, road or shipping services).
2This is the minimum number of links needed to connect n actors.
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modest, but she will either not undertake many exchanges (as she has no path connecting
her to several traders) or she will conduct her exchange with the help of intermediaries.
Over and above this, this environment gives rise to an intermediation incentive: an actor
may wish to strategically form links with others with a view to extracting rents by acting as
an intermediary for trades between other actors. Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2007] propose
that surplus generated by exchange between two traders is split equally between these two
traders and the set of ‘critical traders’: a trader A is critical for traders B and C in a
network if she lies on all paths between the pair. With this allocation rule, they show that
a wide range of networks can be strategically stable: this includes the hub-spoke network
and the cycle network. The complete network is never stable with this allocation rule.
One feature of this surplus allocation rule is that trade can take place along arbitrarily
long paths even when shorter paths are available, and that too without any costs. However,
if costs are similar, it is easy to see that a small friction arising out of distance would make
a large difference in the flow of trade. Following Kleinberg et al. [2008] and Galeotti and
Goyal [2014] consider an alternative allocation rule where surplus of a bilateral exchange is
distributed equally between the two traders and the intermediaries that lie on the shortest
paths between them. This gives rise to intermediation rents in proportion to the between-
ness centrality of traders. With this allocation rule, a wide range of networks – such as
the hub-spoke network and the complete network – are stable. The cycle, however, is not
stable. These observation set the stage for an experimental investigation of intermediation
and network formation.
In a real world setting, groups are often very large and individuals choose linking
at different points in time. The individual decision problem is complicated because the
attractiveness of links depends on the overall structure of links. As group size grows, these
informational requirements become more demanding. So it is quite unclear if subjects will
follow the predictions of a static model. The work of Friedman and Aprea [2012], and Choi
et al. [2019], suggests that continuous time experiments offer subjects more opportunities
for choice and for learning and that they may offer better prospects for convergence to
equilibrium than discrete time experiments. Our paper builds on this insight.
A large-scale continuous-time experiment on network formation generates a great deal of
information that is in principle relevant for decision making. To help subjects navigate this
environment, we develop a new experimental platform. This platform includes a network
visualization tool that uses the Barnes-Hut approximation algorithm (Barnes and Hut
[1986]). This algorithm allocates nodes and edges in a two-dimensional space to improve
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visual clarity of network presentation. This tool for network visualization is integrated
with the interactive tool of dynamic choices. This feature allows individuals to form and
remove links and change effort levels instantly. The integration enables us to update rapidly
evolving networks in real time on the computer screen.
The paper considers a design with three alternative allocation rules for intermediation
rents; the two rules discussed above and an additional rule that is close to the betweenness
centrality allocation rule but imposes the restriction of trade taking place within a cer-
tain distance. Different allocation rules generate different incentives for individual linking
activities and result in different predictions on pairwise stable networks. However, the
multiplicity of pairwise stable networks makes it difficult to predict the role of allocation
rules in the emergence of networks. We use the experiment as a complement to the theory
to predict empirically salient outcomes. There are four distinct groups of 50 subjects, each
of whom play 6 rounds. In each round, the linking game is played over 6 minutes. The
experiment involves groups of 50 subjects in a controlled laboratory environment.
Figures 1a presents snap shot of the network that emerges under criticality. The network
is sparse and trades take place along long cycles. The network is connected and sparse:
subjects realize almost 90% of all possible surplus. And there exist a few critical nodes with
limited power: the payoffs are very equal. In contrast, Figure 1b reveals a very different
network that emerges under betweenness allocation rule. We observe a network that closely
approximates a hub-spoke structure. The network is sparse and connected: consequently
it attains high efficiency. However, the ‘hub’ earns more than 12 times the median payoff.
The analysis of the data reveals that these patterns are robust across the rounds and the
groups.
Our experiment shows that differences in the allocation rules give rise to very different
networks: linking is quite dispersed under criticality, whereas network centralization is
prominent in the other two treatments. As a result, trades take place in longer distance
in the criticality treatment. There emerges a main broker in the betweenness treatments
who involves in trading for many pairs of traders.
The emergence of different networks has large implications in inequality. Payoffs are
equally distributed among subjects in the criticality treatment but are highly unequal in the
other two treatments. The individual earning the highest payoff in these treatment turns
out to be the main broker in the network who earn a huge amount of intermediation rents.
Therefore, the main source of payoff inequality is the unequal distribution of brokerage
rents among individuals.
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(a) Criticality pricing (b) Betweenness pricing
Figure 1: Network Outcomes (at minute 6)
In order to examine the forces of driving the emergence of different networks across the
allocation rules, we look into subjects’ myopic incentives that show changes of payoffs from
creating or deleting a link from a given network. Under the criticality-based allocation
rule, once the network is connected, individuals can benefit by adding new links whenever
they have less than 2 links, and by deleting links whenever they have more than 2 links.
In other words, they are incentivized to maintain only 2 links, necessary to create cycles
and avoid paying rents to intermediaries. They also have no incentive to directly connect
with a critical intermediary.
On the other hand, under the betweenness-based allocation rules, subjects’ incentives
are more subtle. We find that subjects initially form many links as a means to maximize
their access to trades (by reducing path lengths with other nodes). Once the network is
connected however, they have a strong incentive to form a link with the subject extracting
the highest brokerage rent while deleting any links with others. In the meantime, the main
broker has an incentive to form new links with others. This allows for the emergence of a
hub-spoke structure.
Our paper is a contribution to the study of intermediation. One strand of the existing
work examines pricing by intermediaries, their ability to reduce frictions, and thereby
extract surpluses. For an early model, see [Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1987]; for more
recent work see [Condorelli et al., 2016],Choi, Galeotti, and Goyal [2017], and Manea
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[2018]. Condorelli and Galeotti [2016] provide a survey of this work.3 Another strand of
work examines how market power emerges through the deliberate creation of links in a
network formation setting: in addition to Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2007], Kleinberg et al.
[2008] and Buskens and Van de Rijt [2008], recent contributions include Farboodi [2014]
and Kotowski and Leister [2018]. Dominant intermediaries are a defining feature of the
modern economy. The present paper presents robust experimental evidence for the rise of
such dominant players and the very large inequality they generate. The strikingly different
outcomes under criticality and betweenness based pricing draw attention to the role of
economic incentives in explaining how such dominance comes about.
These findings on inequality are intimately related to major themes in the behavioral
and experimental economics literature. A prominent strand of work argues for the role
of inequality aversion in shaping human behavior in economic interaction. Prominent
contributions include [Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000] and [Kosfeld
et al., 2009]. In the context of networks, Falk and Kosfeld [2012] and Goeree et al. [2009]
argue that inequality aversion explains why experimental subjects do not create the hub-
spoke predicted by the theory. In our setting, networks with dominant hubs arise and
there is great inequality. How can we reconcile our findings with these earlier findings?
We show that, somewhat surprisingly, the large inequality in our experiment is consistent
with inequity aversion [Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000]. Indeed,
models based on average payoff differences are tolerant to large inequalities between a few
wealthy individuals and others in a large population.4 For example, take a population of n
individuals where everyone earns x except for one person earning 10x. While an inequality
averse individual may strongly disapprove of the large disadvantageous payoff difference
between themselves and the wealthiest person (10x−x is large), the same individual would
be more tolerant of the average inequality in the context of the entire group (10x−xn−1 is small
for some large n). In other words, the aversion to isolated inequalities is diluted in large
groups and therefore has limited effects on individual incentives.
Furthermore, we note that behavior observed in our experiment is also consistent with
3For experiments on trading in networks and on intermediation, see Gale and Kariv [2009], Kariv et al.
[2018], Charness et al. [2007] and Choi, Galeotti, and Goyal [2017]. For a survey of experiments on networks,
see Choi, Gallo, and Kariv [2016].
4According to Fehr and Schmidt [1999], given a group of n individuals and a vector of (monetary)
earnings pi = (pi1, . . . , pin), the utility of person i is determined by: ui(pi) = pii − αin−1
∑
j max(0, pij − pii)−
βi
n−1
∑
j max(0, pii−pij) where α defines i’s distaste for disadvantageous inequality, and β defines i’s distaste
for advantageous inequality such that 0 ≤ β < 1 and βi < αi.
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the theory of fairness relying on efficiency seeking from Charness and Rabin [2002]. Ac-
cording to this model, individuals weight how much they care about pursing the social
welfare by maximizing the aggregate payoffs, versus their own self-interest.5 In the above
example, an individual with such fairness concerns would compare their own payoff x with
the aggregate payoff (n−1)x+10x. Consequently, by making the aggregate welfare salient
to the individuals, a large group size n can encourage efficiency seeking behavior. In our
experiment, this type of incentives can promote the emergence of hub spoke structures.
Our paper contributes to the experimental literature on continuous time games. Exist-
ing studies are built on a development of an experimental software, called ConG (Pettit,
Friedman, Kephart, and Oprea [2014]) and have focused on small group interactions (see
e.g., Friedman and Aprea [2012]; Calford and Oprea [2017]). The novelty of our experimen-
tal software is that it enables us to study large group interactions. In order to overcome
information overload of evolving networks and relax subjects’ cognitive bounds in informa-
tion processing, our software integrates the network visualization tool with the interactive
tool of asynchronous choices in real time. This is achieved by adopting an enhanced com-
munication protocol between the server and subjects’ computers. It allows us to run both
network visualization and asynchronous dynamic choices in real time without communi-
cation congestion and lagged responses, even when participants are interacting remotely
from different physical locations.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the three
payoff models and discuss their properties in terms of stability, efficiency and inequality.
Section 3 presents details about the large scale network formation experiment used to study
the problem of intermediation, after discussing the various challenges associated with it.
Section 4 presents the main experimental findings together with their explanations. All
proofs and supplementary materials (including experimental instructions) are presented in
the Appendix.
5According to Charness and Rabin [2002], given a group of n individuals and a vector of (monetary)
earnings pi = (pi1, . . . , pin), the utility of person i is determined by: ui(pi) = (1−λi)pii+λi[δi min(pi1, . . . , pin)+
(1−δi)∑j pij ] where λi ∈ [0, 1] defines how much i cares about pursuing the social welfare versus his own self-
interest, and δi ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of concern for helping the worst-off person versus maximizing
the total social surplus. Efficiency seeking therefore assumes δi = 0.
6Also see our companion paper Choi, Goyal, and Moisan [2019], that uses the same platform to conduct
a large scale experiment on the ‘law of the few’ model of Galeotti and Goyal [2010].
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2 Theory
We consider a game with N = {1, 2, ..., n} individuals, where n ≥ 3. Relationships between
nodes are conceptualized in terms of binary variables, so that a relationship either exists
or does not exist. Denote by gij ∈ {0, 1} a relationship between two nodes i and j. The
variable gij takes on a value of 1 if there exists a link between i and j and 0, otherwise.
Links are undirected, i.e., gij = gji. The set of nodes taken along with the links between
them defines the network; this network is denoted by g and the collection of all possible
networks on n nodes is denoted by G. Given a network g, in case gij = 0, g + gij adds
the link gij = 1, while if gij = 1 in g, then g + gij = g. Similarly, if gij = 1 in g, g − gij
deletes the link gij . Let Ni(g) = {j|gij = 1} denote the nodes with whom node i has
a link; this set will be referred to as the neighbors of i. Let ηi(g) = |Ni(g)| denote the
number of connections/neighbors of node i in network g. Furthermore, let d(i, j; g) denote
the geodesic distance between players i and j in network g.
Individuals propose links with others. The strategy of a player i is a vector of link
proposals si = [sij ]j∈N\{i}, with sij ∈ {0, 1} for any j ∈ N\{i}. The strategy set of player
i is denoted by Si. A link between agents i and j is formed if both propose a link to each
other, i.e., gij = sijsji. A strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) induces an undirected network
g(s).7 The network g(s) = {gij}i,j∈N is a formal description of the pairwise links that exist
between the players. There exists a path between i and j in a network g if either gij = 1, or
if there is a distinct set of players i1, . . . , in such that gii1 = gi1i2 = gi2i3 = . . . = ginj = 1.
All players with whom i has a path defines the component of i in g, which is denoted by
Ci(g).
Suppose that players are traders who can exchange goods and that this exchange creates
a surplus of V . This exchange can be carried out only if these traders have a link or if
there is a path between them. There is a fixed (marginal) cost c per individual for every
link that is established. On the other hand, any proposal that is not reciprocated carries
no cost.
The central issue here is how are potential surpluses allocated between the different
parties to the trade. In the case where two traders have a link, it is natural that they split
the surplus equally, each earning V2 . If they are linked indirectly, then the allocation of
the surplus depends on the nature of competition between the intermediary agents. One
simple idea is to view these paths as being perfect substitutes. Another possibility is that
7With a slight abuse of notation, for simplicity, we will write g instead of g(s).
7
the paths offer differentiated trading mechanisms. We will develop models of intermediation
that build on these ideas.
2.1 Models
We start with the notion of paths between traders being perfect substitutes. All traders
set prices simultaneously. Trade occurs along the cheapest path (or at a path picked at
random in case there are multiple cheapest paths). A trader is said to be critical for a pair
of traders A and B if she lies on all paths between these traders. Trade between A and
B occurs if there is a path on which the sum of prices set by the intermediaries is smaller
than or equal to V . Using a combination of theory and experiments, Choi, Galeotti, and
Goyal [2017] show that, for any network, this pricing game generates a sharp prediction:
the surplus is divided more or less equally between the origin and destination traders and
the critical traders, while the non-critical traders earn close to zero. We build on this result
to develop a payoff function in the network formation game with intermediation.
Formally, a trader i is said to be critical for trader j and k if i lies on every path between
j and k in the network. Denote by T (j, k; g) the set of players who are critical for j and
k in network g and let t(j, k; g) = |T (j, k; g)|. Following Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2007],
we may write the payoffs as follows. For every strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) the net
payoffs to player i are given by:
Πcriti (s) =
∑
j∈Ci(g)
V
e(i, j; g) + 2
+
∑
j,k∈N\{i}
V
Ii∈T (j,k;g)
t(j, k; g) + 2
− ηi(g)c (1)
where Ii∈T (j,k) ∈ {0, 1} stands for the indicator function specifying whether i is critical
for j and k. This payoff offers a very simple rule for the allocation of trading surpluses.
We shall refer to it as the model of criticality based payoffs.
One feature of this payoff model is slightly implausible: trade can take place along
arbitrarily long paths even when shorter paths are available, and that too without any
costs. However, if costs are similar, it is easy to see that a small friction arising out
of distance would make a large difference in the flow of trade. To take this factor into
account, we consider a simple alternative model of intermediation that emphasizes the role
of shortest paths between traders.
Formally, let njk = d(j, k; g)−1 denote the number of intermediaries on a shortest path
between j and k in network g. Trade between j and k is equally distributed among the
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source and destination j and k, and among the intermediaries on the shortest path. In the
case of multiple shortest paths, one of them is randomly chosen. Therefore, the (ex-ante)
expected return for any trader i is in proportion to the shortest paths between j and k
that i lies on. Formally, we write bijk(g) ∈ [0, 1] to denote betweenness of player i between
j and k. For every strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and the resulting network g(s), the
net payoffs to player i are given by:
Πbtwni (s) =
∑
j∈Ci(g)
V
d(i, j; g) + 2
+
∑
j,k∈N\{i}
V
bijk
d(j, k; g) + 2
− ηi(g)c (2)
We shall refer to this formulation as the model with betweenness based payoffs. Be-
tweenness based payoffs have been proposed as a model for the allocation of surplus in a
network by Kleinberg et al. [2008] and Galeotti and Goyal [2014].
The betweenness based pricing system allows for trade on shortest paths of arbitrary
length. Kleinberg et al. [2008] also impose the restriction trade only takes if traders are
within distance 2. Buskens and Van de Rijt [2008], Burger and Buskens [2009] propose
similar restrictions on the distance between traders. This motivates a third model, in which
every intermediary on a selected shortest path earns a fixed rent 0 < p ≤ V . Since a trade
between j and k generates a finite surplus of V , trade only takes place if the number of
intermediaries on a shortest path njk ≤ 10p . Traders j and k equally share the remaining
part of the surplus, i.e., V − njkp ≥ 0. This sets a natural bound to the limits of trade.
For every strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) and the resulting network g(s), we define the
net payoffs to player i by:
Πdisti (s) =
∑
j∈Ci(g)
max(0, V − pnij)
2
+ p
∑
j,k∈N
Injk≤Vp b
i
jk(g)− ηi(g)c (3)
where Injk≤Vp ∈ {0, 1} stands for the indicator function specifying whether the trade
between j and k is realized in network g. We shall refer to this formulation as distance
based payoffs.
2.2 Stability and Welfare
We will study pairwise stable networks. Following Jackson and Wolinsky [1996], a network
is pairwise stable if no one can benefit by removing any existing link, and no pair can
mutually benefit by adding a non existing link with each other.
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Definition 1. A strategy profile s∗ leads to a pairwise stable network g(s∗) if the following
conditions hold:
• For any i ∈ N and any si ∈ Si, Πi(s∗) ≥ Πi(si, s∗−i);
• For any i, j ∈ N and any s ∈ S such that gij(s∗) = 0 and g(s) = g(s∗) + gij, if
Πi(s) > Πi(s
∗), then Πj(s) < Πj(s∗).
We now turn to the welfare aspects of networks. The efficiency of an outcome is
measured as the ratio between the sum of individual payoffs and the maximum sum of
individual payoffs that can be achieved:
E(s) =
∑
i Πi(s)
maxs′
∑
i Πi(s
′)
(4)
It follows that E(s) ≤ 1. A network is said to be socially efficient if it maximizes social
welfare, i.e., E(s) = 1.
Observe that in our setting, the intermediation payoffs cancel out. So surplus arises out
of trades realized less the costs of forming links. There is therefore no benefit in having a
cycle in a network, as that merely adds to the costs, without any gain in additional trades
being realized. So, every component in an efficient network must be minimally connected
or a singleton. From Goyal and Vega-Redondo [2007] it follows that an efficient network
is either the empty network or the minimally connected network. The total payoffs in
the latter case are V n(n−1)2 − 2(n − 1)c and they are equal to 0 in the case of an empty
network. So it follows that an efficient network is minimally connected if c < V n4 , and empty
otherwise. A prominent example of minimally connected network is the star network (see
Figure 2b).
We turn next to inequality: for a survey of inequality measures, see Dasgupta et al.
[1973]. As hub-spoke networks arise naturally in our context, we would like to have a
measure that captures extremely large payoffs appropriately. We define inequality as the
ratio of the largest payoff to the median payoff.
I(s) =
maxi(Πi(s))
medi(Πi(s))
(5)
It follows that I(s) ≥ 1. An outcome is said to be equal if I(s) = 1. In the appendix,
for completeness, we also present other measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient.
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(a) Cycle (b) Star
Figure 2: Cycle and Star networks
Observe that the outcome is equal in the empty network and in a cycle network (see
Figure 2a). By contrast, in the star network, under the criticality and betwenness models
above, the hub and spoke earn, respectively
V (n− 1)
[
1
2
+
n− 2
6
]
− (n− 1)c V
[
1
2
+
n− 2
3
]
− c (6)
The ratio of the hub payoff versus the spoke payoff is clearly growing and unbounded
in n. More specifically, the ratio of hub payoffs to the median payoff too is unbounded (the
median payoff corresponds to the spoke’s payoff).
More generally, observe that in all three models, efficiency dictates that a non-empty
network must be minimal. In a minimal network, some nodes will necessarily be leaves and
will earn zero intermediation rents, while other nodes will be critical and will earn positive
intermediation rents. So there is a tension between efficiency and equality. While this is
true in general, it is also worth noting that in the criticality and betweenness models, the
cycle network is almost perfectly efficient, as it contains only 1 redundant link. With this in
mind we now draw attention to a class of networks that combine elements of cycles and/or
stars. In particular, networks with multiple local stars are as efficient as the star network,
as they similarly are minimally connected (see Figure 3a). However, the inequality they
generate can differ and vary with the size of the network and the number of links formed by
the main hub. Indeed, in specific settings, the earnings of the main hub can be larger that
those of the hub in the star network of the same size. Other networks involving multiple
cycles combined with a star, as shown in Figure 3b, offer different interesting features. The
multiplicity of cycles has direct consequences on decreasing efficiency as they each add one
extra link without generating extra benefits (in the context of criticality and betweenness
11
(a) Local stars (b) Cycle-star
Figure 3: Hybrid networks
based models). Furthermore, the presence of a star connecting cycles can generate large
inequality, which can surpass that of the star network. This is because extra links decrease
payoffs earned by non-hub players on cycles, whereas the hub earns large benefits without
forming too many links (at least in the criticality based model).
2.3 Analysis
This section examines the incentives for linking in the three models, through a study of
pair-wise stable networks. We have been unable to develop a complete characterization of
pairwise stable networks. To focus attention on the key dimensions of efficiency and equity,
we will pay special attention to the cycle and star networks.
We begin with a result on criticality based payoffs.
Proposition 1. Suppose payoffs are given by (1). There always exists a pairwise stable
network. Pairwise stable networks include the empty network if c > V2 , the star network if
V
6 < c <
V n
3 − V6 , and the cycle network if c <
∑n−2
i=1
V i
2(2+i) . The complete network is not
stable for n ≥ 4.
Proofs of all results in this section are presented in the Appendix A.
A general observation is that pairwise stable networks cover a wide range of structures
including the star and the cycle. So incentives in this model sustain networks with very
small diameter as well as very large diameter. This also means that stability is not in-
compatible with efficiency or equality. However, the stability of star and cycle does focus
attention on the issue of equality.
We turn next to betweenness based payoffs.
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Proposition 2. Suppose payoffs are given by (2). There always exists a pairwise stable
network. Pairwise stable networks include the empty network if c > V2 , the complete
network if c < V6 , and the star network if
V
6 < c <
V n
3 − V6 . Given values for c and V , the
cycle is not pairwise stable for large n.
This result yields one important insight: betweenness based pricing rules out the cycle
network. For large n, a cycle network creates incentives for traders to create bridges that
reduce the shortest path length. This bridge cuts down intermediation payment for traders
who create the link and also enhances their intermediation rents as they now sit on shortest
paths for many other traders.
Finally, we turn to stable networks when pricing is based on distance based payoffs.
Proposition 3. Suppose payoffs are given by (3). There always exists a pairwise stable
network. Pairwise stable networks include the empty network if c > V2 , the complete
network if c < p2 , and the star network if
p
2 < c <
V
2 + (n − 2) min(p, V−p2 ). The cycle is
not pairwise stable for large n when c < 5V
2
2p − 4V + 2p.
This result on pairwise stability is similar to the finding for the betweenness based
payoffs model. The main difference between those models relates to efficiency: unlike in
the previous models, connectivity of a network does not guarantee realization of all trades
in the distance based payoffs model. As a result, networks with a large diameter are not
efficient.
To summarize, the empty network and star network are pairwise stable in all three
models. However, in the criticality model, a cycle network (and hybrid cycle-star networks)
are also stable, while they are not stable in the betweenness and distance based payoff
models. By contrast, in the latter two models, a complete network is stable, and this is
never the case in the criticality based payoffs model. The star is efficient under a wide
range of circumstances, but it leads to extreme inequality. By contrast, the cycle (and
related networks) are close to being efficient and attain equality. These observations set
the stage for our experiments.
2.4 Experimental Setting
We now present details of the theoretical analyses in the context of our experiment with
concrete parameter settings. Focusing on a fixed group size n = 50, we choose a value
V = 10 for the surplus generated by a trade, and a cost of linking c = 40. In the particular
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case of the distance based model described by (3), we set the fixed brokerage rent to p = 3,
which restricts trades to be realized only within a distance 4 (at most 3 intermediaries).
In this context, theoretical results in terms of pairwise stability, efficiency, and inequality
for some concrete network structures are summarized in Table 1.
Network Payoffs
Pairwise Efficiency Inequality
stability E(s) I(s)
Star
(1) yes 1 17.6
(2) yes 1 17.6
(3) yes 1 13.6
Cycle
(1) yes 0.99 1
(2) no 0.99 1
(3) no < 0 1
Table 1: Features of non-empty networks according to experimental setting
3 Experiment
3.1 Challenges and methodology
The goal of this paper is to understand the role of pricing mechanisms in shaping trade
and intermediation through network formation in large groups. Experiments in this setting
pose at least several challenges to human subjects because of (i) the large decision space,
(ii) the complexity of payoff functions, and (iii) the observability of link proposals and
network structure. We discuss these challenges and explain how our experimental software
and design address each of them. Some of the discussion is taken from our companion
paper, Choi, Goyal, and Moisan [2019].
Learning and dynamics. We wish to allow subjects ample opportunities to learn about
the environment of decision making, other subjects’ behaviors, and how to respond opti-
mally to them. Because of the complexity of payoff functions and decision making, the issue
of learning and behavioral convergence is particularly important. To address these issues,
we run the experiment in continuous time with near real time updating on the evolution
of network structure and link proposals made by and to the subject.8 Continuous time
8More precisely, the network depicted on any subject’s screen is updated every 2 seconds or whenever
the subject makes a new decision.
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experiments can also offer better prospects for convergence than discrete time experiments
(see e.g., Friedman and Aprea [2012]).
In our experiment, the game is played in continuous time for 6 minutes during which
every subject was free to asynchronously adjust their link proposals. Because subjects
face a complex problem of decision making and need some time to figure out the game and
coordinate their actions, a trial time of one minute is provided (during which subjects start
choosing their actions with no monetary consequence). After the trial period is over, the
subsequent 5 minutes are payoff relevant and one second is randomly chosen to determine
subjects’ earnings in the game. This information is publicly known to subjects (see detailed
instructions in the appendix).
Two-sided linking protocol. The intermediation models we consider use the two-sided
linking protocol with which a link between two individuals is formed if and only if both
individuals consent to form it. This protocol distinguishes between link proposals (i.e.,
choices made by subjects) and realized links (i.e., link proposals that are reciprocated).
Compared to the one-sided linking protocol, the two-sided linking protocol introduces an
extra layer of the relationship between any two individuals: the pair is linked, or unlinked
with none of them making a link proposal, or unlinked with only one of them making a
link proposal to the other. Keeping track of such information in large groups can be a
challenge for human subjects.
In order to make it easy for the decision maker to grasp the relation with any individual,
we use the visual representation on the status of the linking relationship between the
decision maker, denoted by Me, and an individual as shown in Table 2: An individual who
neither made a proposal to nor received a proposal from the decision maker is represented
with a circle shape; If an individual sent a link proposal to the decision maker who did not
reciprocate it, that individual is depicted with a square shape; If an individual receives a link
proposal from the decision maker but did not reciprocate it, the individual is represented
with a triangle shape; If both an individual and the decision maker make link proposals
to each other, the link between them is visualized with the individual being shaped with a
circle.
On the other hand, from the decision maker’s perspective, information about the rela-
tion between any other two individuals is provided in the binary form: the corresponding
pair is shown to be either linked or not linked. Therefore, no information about the detail
of unlinked individuals is provided to the decision maker.
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No link / no proposal ⇒
Sent proposal ⇒
Received proposal ⇒
Realized link ⇒
Table 2: Visualization of proposals and link
Figure 4 illustrates our method of distinguishing these different cases. In the initial
network depicted on the left side of Figure 4, the decision maker who is represented with a
yellow node identified as “me” does not make any link proposal, but receives link proposals
from players P2, P3, and P4; these individuals are triangle shaped. From the network on
the left, if the decision maker makes link proposals to P2, P3, P4, and P6, the network
changes to the right side of Figure 4. The decision maker then have three realized links with
P2, P3, and P4, and one pending link proposal to P6. On the other hand, the decision
maker can only see the realized links between any other players (e.g., between P1 and
P5); no information is provided about unlinked pairs (e.g., the pair of P5 and P7 may be
unlinked because either P5, P7, or both P5 and P7 do not make a link proposal).
Network visualization. Existing studies of network formation in economics have con-
sidered small group sizes such as 4 or 8 people in a group and visualized evolving networks
with fixed positions of nodes (e.g., Goyal et al. [2017]; van Leeuwen et al. [2018]). When
the group size increases, such a representation of networks with fixed positions of nodes
makes it very difficult for subjects to perceive network features adequately. For example,
consider a group of 20 people with fixed positions of nodes in a circle as depicted in Figure
5a. While the exact nature of the network is hardly perceptible by observing Figure 5a,
the same network structure can be represented in a transparent manner in Figure 5b.
For subjects to learn what to do, they must have a good idea of the evolving networks.
An appropriate tool for visualizing networks is thus critical in running large-scale exper-
iments in continuous time. This leads us to develop an experimental software including
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Figure 4: Example of network updates after new choices
(a) Fixed visualization (b) Adaptive visualization
Figure 5: Examples of network visualization
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an interactive network visualization tool that allows the network to automatically reshape
itself based on its evolving structure. We use the Barnes-Hut approximation algorithm
[Barnes and Hut, 1986] for grouping nodes in a network that are sufficiently nearby and
adjust their relative positions on the subject’s computer screen. It enables us to apply
repulsion forces between nodes so that they are sufficiently separated from one another,
attractive forces to nodes that are directly linked with each other, and gravity to all the
nodes with respect to a central origin on the screen such that nodes not linked with each
other remain within reasonable distance from each other.
The network visualization in Figure 5b was made using this algorithm. In our large-
scale experiment, this visualization tool improves graphical clarity of evolving networks
and helps subjects distinguish between those who hold an important brokerage position
and those who do not (e.g., P4 is the key intermediary in Figure 5b and extract the largest
brokerage rents). It is important to emphasize that this tool allows interaction between
the subject and the network: while the nodes are subject to the above attraction and
repulsion forces, they can also be freely manipulated by the participant through the usual
drag-select functionality. The creation and removal of links is also interactive through
double-clicking on corresponding nodes. A further detail regarding the specifics of the
network visualization tool can be referred to Choi, Goyal, and Moisan [2019].
3.2 Treatments and design details
The experiment varies the pricing mechanism used to determine the cost of intermediation
for each realized trade according to the three models described above: Treatment Criti-
cality is based on (1), Treatment Betweenness is based on (2), and Treatment Distance
is based on (3). The cost of linking, set to c = 40, is paid only when a link is realized, i.e.,
when both players make a proposal to each other.
At any instant in the 6 minutes game, every subject can make or remove a proposal
to another subject by simply double-clicking on the corresponding node in the computer
screen. Any reciprocated proposal leads to the formation of a link. Any non reciprocated
proposal sent is characterized by the targeted node’s shape being a square. Finally, any non
reciprocated proposal received is characterized by the source node’s shape being a triangle.
The default node shape for nodes involving no link or proposal is the circle. Every subject
can see every node on the screen, regardless of their position in the network. Some zoom
in/out options are also made available for the subject to personalize their visualization of
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the network.
At any moment of the experiment, each subject is provided with detailed information
about their own net payoff resulting from the currently depicted network structure. More
precisely, subjects explicitly see the amount of access benefits, brokerage rents, overall cost
of linking, and net payoffs. Finally, the subjects are also provided with information about
the net payoffs of every other player, which are described in each corresponding node of
the network. Further information on the screen is provided in Online Appendix D.
3.3 Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted in the Laboratory for Research in Experimental and Behav-
ioral Economics (LINEEX) at the University of Valencia. Subjects in the experiment were
recruited from online recruitment systems of the laboratory. Each subject participated in
only one of the experimental sessions. After subjects read the instructions, the instructions
were read aloud by an experimenter to guarantee that they all received the same infor-
mation. While reading the instructions, the subjects were provided with a step by step
interactive tutorial which allowed them to get familiarized with the experimental software
and the game. Subjects interacted through computer terminals and the experimental soft-
ware was programmed using HTML, PHP, Javascript, and SQL. Sample instructions and
interactive tutorials are available in Online Appendix C.
There were in total 12 sessions: 4 sessions of 50 subjects for each of the Criticality,
Betweenness, and Distance treatments. In each experimental session, 50 subjects were
matched to form a group and interacted with the same subjects throughout the experiment.
Therefore, there are 4 independent groups for each treatment. A total of 600 subjects
participated in the experiment.
The experiment consists of 6 rounds of the continuous-time game, each of which lasted
for 6 minutes with the first minute as a trial period and the subsequent 5 minutes as the
game with payment consequence. At the end of each round, every subject was informed,
using the same computer screen, of a time moment randomly chosen for payment, detailed
information on subjects’ behavior at the chosen moment including a network structure
and all subjects’ earnings. While each group of people was fixed in a session, subjects’
identification numbers were randomly reassigned at the beginning of every round in order
to reduce potential repeated game effects. The first round was a trial round with no payoff
relevance and the subsequent 5 rounds were effective for subjects’ earnings. In analyzing
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the data, we will focus on subjects’ behavior and group outcomes from the last 5 rounds.
At the beginning of the experiment, each subject was endowed with an initial balance of
400 points and added positive earnings to or subtracted negative earnings from that initial
balance. Subjects’ total earnings in the experiment amounted to the sum of earnings
across the last 5 rounds and the initial endowment. Earnings were calculated in terms of
experimental points and then exchanged into euros at the rate of 110 points being equal to
1 euro. Each session lasted on average 90 minutes, and subjects earned on average about
16.4 euros, including a 5 euros show-up fee.
At the end of the experiment, subjects took incentivized tasks to elicit social preferences
and risk preferences. They are a modified version of Andreoni and Miller [2002] and Holt
and Laury [2002], respectively. In addition, subjects answered a brief version of the Big Five
personality inventory test adapted from Rammstedt and John [2007], a comprehension test
related to the experimental game, and a debriefing questionnaire including demographic
information. More details about them can be found in Online Appendix E.
4 Experimental Results
This section presents our experimental findings on the impact of pricing rules on efficiency,
inequality, and network structure. It also discusses how the large effects we observe can be
understood in terms of myopic best response by individuals to incentives for link formation,
across the different pricing rules.
For simplicity, in all the empirical analyses, the data is organized on a second to second
basis. So, every round yields us 360 observations – snapshots of every subject’s choices in
the group. Although some information about choice dynamics between two time intervals
may be lost, we believe that the second by second record is adequate for our purposes.
Moreover, unless otherwise stated, all analyses are focused on data from the last 5 payoff
relevant minutes of each round of the game. Using this data set, we run linear regressions
for treatment effects with standard errors clustered at the group level and report regression
results in Appendix B.
4.1 Efficiency
We begin with the analysis of the treatment effects on efficiency. Figure 6 shows the
dynamics of efficiency attained. The efficiency measure is relative to the first best network.
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Figure 6: Dynamics of efficiency
The vertical dotted line represents the 60th second from the beginning of the game, after
which the play of the game is payoff relevant.
There are substantial differences across treatments: under criticality pricing, subjects
attain (an almost constant) 80% efficiency. On the other hand, efficiency in the other two
treatments is initially very low — around 28% and 16%, respectively, under betweenness
and distance pricing. Efficiency steadily increases over time, eventually reaching 70%
and 61%, respectively. The level of efficiency under betweenness and distance pricing is
significantly lower than that under criticality pricing, controlling for the time trends. For
details on the regression estimates refer to Table 4 in Appendix B.
The effects of pricing rule on efficiency are large. What are the sources for this great
difference? There are potentially two reasons for loss in efficiency: breakdown of trade
due to missing connections and an excessive number of links. Figure 7 presents data on
fraction of realized trades and on the total number of links.
Figure 7a shows that (roughly) 99% of all trades are realized under all pricing rules.
Hence, there is little loss of efficiency due to breakdown of trade. Figure 7b shows that the
number of links under criticality pricing is (around) 70 and is stable over the last 5 payoff
relevant minutes. On the other hand, the number of links is 121 and 133, respectively, at
the start and decline to 79 and 88, respectively under betweenness and distance pricing.
Controlling for time trends, we observe that the average number of links under criticality
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(a) Fraction of realized trades (b) Total number of links
Figure 7: Sources of inefficiency
pricing is significantly lower than under the other two pricing rules. The regression results
are presented in Table 5 in Appendix B. Note that the number of links in an efficient
network is 49. We are led to the conclusion that over-linking is the principal source of
inefficiency in the experiment. Our analysis of efficiency is summarized as follows.
Result 1 (Efficiency) (i)The level of efficiency is consistently high under criticality pric-
ing. (ii) Under betweenness and distance pricing, efficiency is initially very low; the
main source of inefficiency is over-linking. The number of links decline over time
and this leads to rising efficiency.
4.2 Inequality
We measure inequality as the ratio of the maximum payoff to the median payoff (as defined
in equation 5).9 Figure 8 presents the dynamics of the (average) ratio of the maximum
payoff to the median payoff. We observe large and significant differences across pricing
rules: the average of the ratio is 2 under criticality pricing, 15 under betweenness pricing
and 19 under distance pricing. These differences are stable across time. We run a linear
regression with time trends: the inequality measure under criticality pricing is significantly
lower than that under the other two pricing rules. These regression results are presented in
Table 6 in the Appendix B. It is worth noting that the inequality observed under criticality
9An alternative measure based on the Gini coefficient is also provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 8: Dynamics of inequality
pricing is closer to the cycle network (I(s) = 1), while the inequality observed under the
other two pricing rules is closer to the hub-spoke network (I(s) ≈ 14 and I(s) ≈ 18 under
betweenness and distance pricing respectively).
What is the source of such a large inequality in earnings? To address this question,
we present the distribution of overall earnings and of brokerage rents. Specifically, we first
compute for each round the average payoffs earned by subjects and rank them from the
lowest to the highest. We then take, for each rank, an average of payoffs across rounds and
groups. Figure 9a presents the bar graphs of the resulting payoffs from the lowest (left)
to the highest (right). This reflects the rather large differences in inequality that we have
noted already. Figure 9b presents the corresponding bar graph of brokerage rents (using
the same ranking system as in Figure 9a).
This figure reveals that under criticality pricing, subjects earn very similar payoffs. In
contrast, under the other two pricing rules, there is a single individual who earns much
larger payoffs than anybody else. The highest earning individual under betweenness and
the distance pricing earns very large brokerage rents; the rest of the subjects earn negligible
brokerage rents. We conclude that the main source of earning inequality is the extremely
unequal distribution of brokerage rents. Our analysis of inequality is summarized as follows:
Result 2 (Inequality) (i) The level of inequality is substantially higher in the between-
ness and distance treatments than in the criticality treatment. (ii) The unequal dis-
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(a) Distribution of payoffs
(b) Distribution of brokerage rents
Figure 9: Sources of inequality
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tribution of brokerage rents is the main source of payoff inequality in the betweenness
and distance treatments.
4.3 Network Structure
The effects on inequality and efficiency ultimately arise out of different linking patterns.
We now turn to a study of network structure under the three pricing rules. Three network
measures are presented: diameter of the network (the shortest distance between the two
most distant subjects), the distribution of (geodesic) distances between subjects, and the
ratio of maximum to minimum number of links of an individual.
Figure 10a presents the dynamics of network diameter. We observe large and statisti-
cally significant difference in network diameter under criticality pricing on the one hand
and the diameter under the other two treatments: the average network diameter is 8.5
under criticality pricing, 4.6 under betweenness pricing and 4.1 under distance pricing.
The differences of network diameter persist over time and are statistically significant. For
details of the regression estimates, refer to Table 7 in Appendix B.
Figure 10b presents the distribution of (geodesic) distances between individual subjects.
Less than 10% of pairs are directly linked (i.e., geodesic distance of 1) in all pricing rules:
this provides strong evidence for sparseness of the emerging networks. However, 54% and
62% of all pairs of subjects under betweenness and distance pricing have distance 2; this
frequency is much lower under criticality pricing at 14%. This difference is reflected in
average path length: it is 3.8 under criticality pricing, 2.4 under betweenness pricing, and
2.2 under distance pricing.10
Next we examine the extent of network centralization across pricing rules: Table 3
reports the average degree distribution. The striking feature is the great centralization
under betweenness and distance pricing: about 2% of individuals – one subject out of 50
– have 25 or more links. However, almost no one has more than 10 links under criticality
pricing. Second, the fraction of subjects with only one link under betweenness and distance
pricing is more than 3 times higher than that under criticality pricing. On the other hand,
the frequency of subjects with two links is more than 2 times higher under criticality pricing
as compared to the other two pricing rules. These observations taken together suggest that
the concentration of linking to a hub is a prominent feature of networks under betweenness
10These findings suggest differences in closeness centrality across pricing regimes. More supporting evi-
dence on closeness is provided in the Appendix (see Figure 16b).
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(a) Network diameter
(b) Distribution of pairs across path lengths
Figure 10: Diameter and closeness
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Figure 11: Dynamics of the ratio of max degree to mean degree
and distance pricing while the patterns of linking under criticality pricing is very dispersed.
Table 3: Distribution of Degrees
Treatment
Degree Criticality Betweenness Distance
0 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%
1 8% 31% 28%
2 43% 19% 19%
3 24% 13% 13%
[4, 10) 23% 29% 30%
[10, 25) 0.7% 6% 7%
[25, 49] 0% 1.6% 1.8%
To further substantiate the different levels of centralization, we present the ratio of
maximum to average degree. Figure 11 presents this ratio. At the start, there is a moderate
difference in this ratio across pricing rules: it is around 6 under criticality pricing and 10
under betweenness and distance pricing. The ratio remains stable under criticality pricing
but rises steadily over time and reach around 25 in the other two pricing rules.
The final statistic we present pertains to the persistence of centrality: Figure 9 suggests
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Figure 12: Dynamic stability of the main broker status
that the highest earning subject under betweenness and distance pricing obtained the
largest brokerage rents. This subject is also the one who attracted the highest number of
links (as shown in Table 3). For every interval of 10 seconds, we define the main broker
as the subject who earns largest brokerage rents for the longest time within the interval.
We study the transition probability of such an individual keeping their status in the next
interval of 10 seconds. Figure 12 shows that there is little persistence of main broker under
criticality pricing: this trader maintains her status with probability (roughly) 30%. On
the other hand, under betweenness and distance pricing, the main broker persists with
probability close to 1. Our analysis of network structure is summarized as follows.
Result 3 (Network structure) (i) The network is dispersed under criticality pricing
while network centralization is strong and grows over time under betweenness and
distance pricing. (ii) The identity of the main broker is unstable under criticality
pricing but very stable under betweenness and distance pricing.
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4.4 Individual Incentives and Behavior
We have observed that pricing rules have large effects on the emerging network structure;
the difference is economically significant as efficiency and inequality varies greatly across
these networks. The large treatment effects arise due to different linking choices by in-
dividuals. In this section, we show that pricing rules give rise to different incentives for
forming and deleting links and this helps account for the large treatment effects.
On way to understand incentives is to ask, for any instant of time t, given an actual
network and the proposals available, what are the maximum and minimum payoff changes
that the individual could obtain by positively responding to a link proposal or by deleting
a link. Note that we do have data about what the individual actually does: so we can,
for the time t, observe the actual choice of subjects and compute from the impact on their
actual earnings.
Figure 13 represents the (average) payoff changes arising out of the actual choices by
individuals of adding a link (solid red line) and deleting a link (solid blue line) across
pricing rules. It also presents the (average) maximum and minimum payoff changes that
the individual could potentially obtain (dotted lines for corresponding colors). Due to
small sample problems, we pool samples and compute average payoff changes in intervals
of 5 consecutive degrees from degree 5.
We note that there is a stark difference in incentives across treatments. Under criticality
pricing, subjects face strong incentives for settling on two links. The figure reveals that
subjects can benefit by adding a link when their degree is either 0 or 1 but cannot benefit
by doing so when their degree is 2 or higher. On the other hand, the incentive for deleting
a link goes the other way: removal of a link is not profitable when their degree is either 1
or 2, and may be profitable when the degree is 3 or higher. Taking these points together,
we find that subjects with degree 2 cannot benefit by a single deviation of either adding
or deleting a link. This observation is consistent with the dispersed network whose degree
distribution has the mode at degree 2. In contrast, under betweenness and distance pricing,
subjects face very different structure of incentives: ‘locally’ it is unprofitable to form a link
beyond one link, and it is profitable to add links if they already attracted many links.
Is subject behavior consistent with these incentives? Figure 14 present the time series
of the proportions of subjects with one link and two links, respectively, across pricing rules.
In the line with the analysis of incentives, the proportion of subjects with degree 1 increases
over time under betweeness and distance pricing rules; it reaches around 50% by the end
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(a) Criticality based pricing
(b) Betweenness based pricing
(c) Distance based pricing
Figure 13: Payoff changes from single actions (add / delete a link)
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of the game. Under criticality pricing, this fraction is much lower, always below 10%.
Second, under criticality pricing subjects maintain two links increasingly more frequently
over time and the frequency of subjects with degree 2 is (roughly) 50% by the end of the
game. Under betweenness and distance pricing, the corresponding frequency is (roughly)
20% over time.
Finally, we examine choices of the individual with the highest degree. Figure 15 presents
the time series of the maximum degree over time across treatments. Under betweenness
and distance pricing, subjects with the highest degree steadily increase their degree, over
time. On the other hand, under criticality pricing, the maximum degree is always below
10.
We summarize our analysis of incentives and individual behavior under pricing rules as
follows:
Result 4 (Incentives and behavior) (i) Under criticality pricing subjects have a (my-
opic) incentive to maintain two links and tend to do so with high frequency. (ii)
Under betweenness and distance pricing, subjects have a (myopic) incentive to either
form only one link or become highly connected. Subject behavior is in line with these
incentives: the proportion of subjects with degree 1 and the maximum degree both
increase over time.
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(a) Proportion of subjects with one link
(b) Proportion of subjects with two links
Figure 14: Time series of proportions of subjects with degree 1 and 2
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Figure 15: Time series of the maximum degree
5 Conclusion
Providing intermediation services can represent a highly profitable activity in the modern
economy. While it facilitates value exchange between users, the presence of dominant in-
termediaries also widens the wealth inequality gap in the population. Previous work on
the economic theory of networks provide some insights into the stability of such outcomes.
However, those models are limited in identifying the economic forces that drive the emer-
gence of such powerful intermediaries. This paper provides an experimental investigation
of this important question.
We conduct a laboratory experiment with groups of 50 subjects (with homogeneous
preferences) who play a link formation game in continuous time. We manipulate the type
of pricing rule that allocates the surplus from bilateral trades that are realized between
connected pairs of subjects in the network. Across three simple rules, the star network with
high efficiency and large inequality is stable. Moreover, the cycle network, which reconciles
efficiency and equality, is stable only under one specific pricing rule (criticality).
Our experiment provides clear evidence that different allocation rules have strong effects
on the macroscopic features of the network. Under the criticality rule, a network with
multiple cycles with long path lengths is observed, thereby generating high efficiency and
low payoff inequality. On the other hand, a hub-spoke network emerges under the other
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pricing rules, thereby increasing efficiency while creating extreme inequalities between the
unique intermediary - the hub - and other actors. This observation clearly contrasts with
previous experimental studies (generally involving small groups) suggesting that inequality
aversion is a powerful barrier to the emergence of extremely unequal outcomes in the lab.
We explain these important treatment effects through the different individual incentives
associated with different pricing rules. Under the criticality rule, subjects are incentivized
to form two links to prevent others from extracting intermediation rents. Under the other
pricing rules, we distinguish between two types of incentives conditional on the individual’s
degree: subjects with low connectivity benefit by forming a single link with the most
central individual; subjects with high connectivity benefit by forming more links to become
more dominant. The subjects’ effective reaction to those myopic incentives, despite the
significant complexity of the decision environment in which they navigate, provides further
support for the novel methods associated with our experimental platform to study large
scale economic phenomena.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Pairwise stability of the Empty network is straightforward.
In the Star network, the hub does not benefit from removing a link if c < V n3 − V6 .
Under the same condition, no spoke can benefit from removing a link. No pair of spokes
can benefit by adding a link with each other if c > V6 . The Star network is therefore
pairwise stable if V6 < c <
V n
3 − V6 .
In the Cycle network, no pair of players can benefit by adding a link because c > 0 and
it cannot change the access benefit (= (n−1)V2 ) or the intermediation rent (= 0). Given that
that the access benefit obtained by a player removing a link is
∑n−1
i=1
V
i+1 , such an action
is not profitable as long as c < V (n−1)2 −
∑n−1
i=1
V
i+1 =
∑n−2
i=1
V i
2(2+i) . The Cycle network is
therefore pairwise stable if c <
∑n−2
i=1
V i
2(2+i) .
In the Complete network, if n = 3 and c < V6 , no one can benefit by removing a link. If
n > 3 and c > 0, then any player can benefit by removing a link because it cannot reduce
either access benefit (= (n−1)V2 ) or intermediation rent (= 0). Therefore. the Complete
network is not pairwise stable for a sufficiently large n.
Finally, it is easy to see that, for any values of c > 0 and n ≥ 3, there is at least one
pairwise stable network among the Empty, Star, and Cycle networks.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Pairwise stability of the empty network is straightforward.
Pairwise stability of the Star network follows the same arguments as in the proof of
Proposition 1.
In the Complete network, no player can benefit by removing a link as long as c < V6 .
In the Cycle network, it is easy to see that, the gain in benefits (access benefits and
brokerage rents) for adding a link between two players sitting at an extreme distance from
one another increases with n. As a result, if n is sufficiently large, then such a move becomes
profitable for both players. This argument naturally extends to any k-cycle-s-Star network
with fixed values of k and s, and a sufficiently large n.
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Finally, it directly follows that, for any values of c > 0 and n ≥ 3, there is at least one
pairwise stable network among the Empty, Star, and Complete networks.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Pairwise stability of the Empty network is straightforward.
In the Star network, the hub does not benefit from removing a link if c < V2 + p(n− 2).
Similarly, no spoke can benefit by removing a link as long as c < V2 +
(n−2)(V−p)
2 . No pair of
spokes can benefit by adding a link with each other if c > p2 . The Star network is therefore
pairwise stable if p2 < c <
V
2 + (n− 2) min(p, V−p2 ).
In the Complete network, no player can benefit by removing a link as long as c < p2 .
In the Cycle network, let x represent the maximum number of intermediaries for a
trade to be realized, i.e., x ≤ Vp . If the group size n is sufficiently large, then adding a link
between two players sitting at an extreme distance from one another leads to the following
gains in benefit earned by each. The gain in access benefit corresponds to V2 +xV − xp(x+1)2
whereas the gain in brokerage rents corresponds to 2px2. The total gain in benefits therefore
adds up to V2 + xV +
px
2 (3x− 1). Since adding a link costs c, such a move is profitable for
both players if V2 + xV +
px
2 (3x − 1) > c. Setting up a conservative value for x such that
x = Vp − 1, the latter condition becomes 5V
2
2p − 4V + 2p > c. Therefore, the cycle network
is not pairwise stable for a sufficiently large n as long as c < 5V
2
2p − 4V + 2p.
Finally, it is easy to see that, for any values of c > 0 and n ≥ 3, there is at least one
pairwise stable network among the Empty, Star, and Complete networks.
B Additional Tables and Figures
B.1 Network Centrality Measures
We consider two standard measures of network centrality: closeness and degree centrality.
Closeness centrality of a player i in a given network g captures how close i is from all
other players. Formally, it is calculated as Cc(i; g) =
∑
j 6=i
n−1
d(i,j;g) . Closeness centrality of a
network g with n players, as used in Figure 16a, corresponds to Cc(g) =
∑n
i=1[C
max
c (g)−Cc(i;g)]
(n−2)(n−1)/(2n−3)
where Cmaxc (g) = maxiCc(i; g). Average closeness centrality of networks realized across
different treatments in the experiment is depicted in Figure 16a.
Degree centrality of a player i in a given network g captures the fraction of links realized
by i. Formally, it corresponds to Cd(i; g) =
∑
j 6=i
ηi(g)
n−1 . Degree centrality of a network g
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with n players, as used in Figure 16b, corresponds to Cd(g) =
∑n
i=1[C
max
d (g)−Cd(i;g)]
n−2 where
Cmaxd (g) = maxiCd(i; g). Average closeness centrality of networks realized across different
treatments in the experiment is depicted in Figure 16b.
(a) Closeness centrality (b) Degree centrality
Figure 16: Network Centrality Measures in the Experiment
B.2 Alternative Inequality Measure
Figure 17 depicts an alternative to the inequality measure presented in the main text,
based on the well known Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient.
B.3 Explanations of Macroscopic Patterns
During the game, we compute the average payoff change for adding a link by considering
all individuals who gained a link by the means of their own single action or that of their
counterpart (or both) at any moment t, conditional on their degree at t-1. For each
observation, we further compute the minimum and maximum payoff change that could have
been obtained by considering all proposals at t-1, from the individual or the counterpart,
that could have turned into a link at t. Similarly, we compute the average payoff for deleting
a link by considering all individuals who lost a link by the means of their own action or
that of their counterpart at any moment t, conditional on their degree at t-1. For each
observation, we further compute the minimum and maximum payoff change that could
have been obtained by considering all links that could have been deleted by the individual
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Figure 17: Lorenz curve and Gini Coefficient
(a) Sum of individual benefits (b) Maximum individual benefits
Figure 18: Distribution of gross payoffs
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or the counterpart at t-1. Corresponding results across treatments are presented in Figure
19.
Furthermore, Figure 20 replicates the analysis depicted in Figure 13, across different
periods during the game. We see that the corresponding patterns are consistent with the
results from Figure 13, indicating that the incentives do not significantly vary over time.
B.4 Regression tables
Table 4: Treatment effects on efficiency
Efficiency
Betwenness -0.532***
(0.022)
Distance -0.641***
(0.053)
Critical × time 0.000***
(0.000)
Betweenness × time 0.001***
(0.000)
Distance × time 0.002***
(0.000)
Constant 0.716***
(0.005)
Number of
observations 18,000
R-squared 0.681
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(a) Criticality based pricing
(b) Betweenness based pricing
(c) Distance based pricing
Figure 19: Payoff changes from actions (add / delete a link)
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(a) Criticality based pricing
(b) Betweenness based pricing
(c) Distance based pricing
Figure 20: Payoff changes from actions (add / delete a link) across different periods during
the game ([61,125], [126,210],[211,285].[286,360])
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Table 5: Treatment effects on the number of links
Nb of links
Betwenness 55.838***
(2.339)
Distance 66.476***
(5.446)
Criticality × time -0.018***
(0.001)
Betweenness × time -0.147***
(0.011)
Distance × time -0.160***
(0.018)
Constant 76.791***
(0.469)
Number of
observations 18,000
R-squared 0.683
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Inequality
Betweenness 9.625***
(0.874)
Distance 23.062***
(2.171)
Criticality × time 0.000
(0.000)
Betweenness × time 0.014***
(0.002)
Distance × time -0.028**
(0.007)
Constant 2.747***
(0.080)
Number of
observations 17,977
R-squared 0.310
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 6: Treatment effects on inequality
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Network Diameter
Betweenness -2.948***
(0.127)
Distance -3.271***
(0.145)
Criticality × time 0.003***
(0.000)
Betweenness × time -0.002***
(0.000)
Distance × time -0.003***
(0.000)
Constant 7.946***
(0.125)
Number of
observations 18,000
R-squared 0.805
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 7: Treatment effects on network diameter
C Experimental instructions
[All treatments]
Please read the following instructions carefully. These instructions are the same for
all the participants. The instructions state everything you need to know in order to
participate in the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of
the experimenters will answer your question.
In addition to the 5 euro show up fee that you are guaranteed to receive, you can earn
money by scoring points during the experiment. The number of points depends on your
own choices and the choices of other participants. At the end of the experiment, the total
number of points that you have earned will be exchanged at the following exchange rate:
110 points = 1 Euro
The money you earn will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. The other
participants will not see how much you earned.
In this experiment, you will participate in 6 independent rounds of the same form. The
first round is for practice and does not count for your payment. The next 5 rounds will be
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counted for your payment. At the beginning of the first round, you will be grouped with
49 other participants; so there are 50 participants in all in your group. This group will
remain fixed throughout the six rounds.
A round
We now describe in detail the process that will be repeated in each of the six rounds.
At the beginning of a round, you in your computer screen will be identified as the circle
of ‘Me’ and the other participants will be randomly assigned an identification number of
the form “Px” where x is a number between 1 and 49, and identified as the circle of “Px”.
The ID assignment of the other participants will remain unchanged within the round and
will be randomly made again at the beginning of the next round (e.g., node P4 does not
refer to the same participant across different rounds).
Each round will last 6 (six) minutes. At the very beginning of the round, participants
will start with an empty network where no link among them is formed. All participants
will then be asked to propose any number of links to any of the other participants to whom
they wish to link by double-clicking on their corresponding nodes. Anyone who makes
a link proposal to you (while you do not make a link proposal with them) will become
triangle-shaped. For example, players P2, P3, and P4 make link proposals to you in the
left part of Figure 1 (while you do not make any link proposal). Similarly, any link proposal
that you make to player who does not make one with you will become square-shaped.
A link between two participants will be formed only if both of the partici-
pants proposed a link with each other. Anyone who is linked with you, called your
neighbour, will become circle-shaped.
For example, from the left part of Figure 1, suppose that you make link proposals to
each of P2, P3, P4 and P6. Because you also received link proposals from P2, P3, and
P4, each of them is now linked to you and becomes circle-shaped. This is shown in the
right part of Figure 1. On the other hand, P6 did not make a link proposal to you, and
as a result, P6 will become square-shaped on your screen. Those who neither proposed a
link to you nor received a link proposal from you will remain circle-shaped (for example,
P1, P5, and P7, in the right part of Figure 1). Note that the network depicted in Figure
1 is also shown on your screen as a tutorial for you to test the experimental interface by
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creating and/or removing link proposals with other (virtual) players.
Figure 1
Every participant will be allowed to add/delete link proposals with other partic-
ipants at any moment during the six minutes of the round. If you delete a link proposal to
a participant who was linked to you (someone shown circle-shaped in the screen), then that
participant will no longer be linked to you and will revert to being triangle-shaped. If you
delete a link proposal to a participant who received a link proposal from you but did not
propose a link to you (who was shown square-shaped in the screen), that participant will
become circle-shaped. For example, starting from the network in the left part of Figure 2,
deleting the link proposals to P3 and P6 will result in the network shown on the right part
of Figure 2. In these ways, the computer screen will update the network every 2 seconds
or whenever you revise your linking decision.
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Figure 2
In summary, the shape of each participant on the computer screen indicates your rela-
tionship with them.
• Circle: they are linked with you or unlinked (no proposal from them or from you)
• Square: you propose a link, but they do not reciprocate.
• Triangle: they propose a link to you, but you do not reciprocate.
The first minute of each round will be a trial period and only the last 5
minutes will be relevant for your earnings in that round. Your earnings in the
round will be based on everyones choice at a randomly selected moment in the last 5
minutes of the round. In other words, any decision made before or after that randomly
chosen moment will not be used to determine your points. This precise moment will be
announced to everyone only at the end of the round, along with the corresponding behavior
and earnings.
In order to help you keep track of potential earnings which you and the other partici-
pants make during the round, your earnings at each moment will be presented at the top
part of the computer screen. In addition, the payoff of each participant from the network
is presented inside their corresponding node (rounded to the closest integer, below their
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identification number).
After participants are informed of their earnings at a randomly chosen moment, the
next round will start with the computer randomly assigning IDs of the other participants
in your group. This group is the same as in the previous round. However, IDs of other
players are likely to be different across different rounds.
Earnings
At the beginning of the experiment, you are given an initial balance of 400 points.
The first round will be used to familiarize yourself with the experiment and will have no
influence on your earnings. Your final earnings at the end of the experiment will consist of
the sum of points you earn across the last 5 rounds, plus this initial balance. Note that if
your final earnings go below 0, they will be treated as 0.
Your earnings in each round depend on benefits you get from your own connection to
the other participants and whether you are critical for the connection between two other
participants (brokerage rent), and the cost of linking you pay.
In a network, two participants are said to be connected when there exists a path
linking them. For example, in the right part of Figure 1, you are connected with the five
participants of P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5.
[Treatment Criticality only]
A participant is said to be critical for the connection between two other participants if
they are connected and the participant lies on ALL paths between them. In the pair be-
tween you and P5, P1 is critical because P1 lies on each of the two paths between you and
P5.
Every connected pair of two participants creates a value of 10 points. The pair creat-
ing the value of 10 points shares this value equally among themselves and all the critical
participants between them.
Your total benefits consist of
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(1) The benefits you earn from your own connection to other participants,
(2) The brokerage rents you earn from by being critical for the connection between pairs
of other participants.
[Treatment Betweenness only]
Flow of transactions between two participants will be only made through a shortest path
between them in the network. This means that only a participant who lies on a shortest
path between two other participants can be involved in transactions and earn brokerage
rent. For instance, consider the right part of Figure 1: between Me and P5, there are two
shortest paths: Me-P4-P1-P5 and Me-P3-P1-P5. Both paths have two participants lying
on them, and can be used for trade between Me and P5.
Every connected pair of two participants create a value of 10 points. This value is
divided equally among the connected pair and participants lying on any existing shortest
path. If M is the number of participants lying on any shortest path for the pair, then each
member of the pair earns 10/(M+2) points. Other participants lying on any shortest
path earns 10/(M+2) points multiplied by the proportion of the number of shortest
paths that she lies on. By way of illustration, consider the right part of Figure 1: there are
two shortest paths between Me and P5 with 2 participants lying on each of them (M=2),
and therefore participants P3 and P4 who lie on one shortest path each receive 1.25 points
(10/(2 + 2) × 1/2). However, participant P1 lies on both the shortest paths and receives
2.5 points (10/(2 + 2)).
Your benefits therefore consist of
(1) The benefits you earn from your own connection to other participants,
(2) The brokerage rents you earn for lying on shortest paths between pairs of other par-
ticipants.
[Treatment Distance only]
Flow of transactions between two participants will be only made through a shortest path
between them in the network. This means that only a participant who lies on a shortest
path between two other participants can be involved in transactions and earn brokerage
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rent. For instance, consider the right part of Figure 1: between Me and P5, there are
two shortest paths: Me-P4-P1-P5 and Me-P3-P1-P5. Both of them can be used for trade
between Me and P5.
A participant lying on a shortest path for a pair of participants receives 3 points
multiplied by the proportion of the number of shortest paths that she lies on. By way of
illustration, consider the right part of Figure 1: there are two shortest paths between Me
and P5, and therefore participants P3 and P4 who lie on one shortest path each receive 1.5
points (3/2). However, participant P1 lies on both the shortest paths and receives 3 points.
Every connected pair of two participants have a potential value of 10 points. This
value is realized only if the sum of brokerage rents on a shortest path that need to be paid
by the two connected participants is less than or equal to 10. If the sum of brokerage rents
exceeds the potential value 10, then the value is not realized: the connected pair and all
participants on every shortest path between them earn 0. In case the value is realized, the
connected pair earns a surplus that equals the value (10) less the sum of brokerage rents.
The surplus is equally divided between the two members of the connected pair.
Your total benefits consist of
(1) The benefits you earn from your own connection to other participants,
(2) The brokerage rents you earn for lying on shortest paths between pairs of other par-
ticipants.
[All treatments]
On the cost side, you pay 40 points per link that is created by you. Note that a link
proposal made by you will cost you 40 points only if the participant who received your
link proposal has also made a link proposal to you. Otherwise, your link proposal does not
create a link and costs nothing.
Therefore, your earnings in each round correspond to the network chosen at a random
moment from the last five minutes of the experiment.
Earnings = (sum of values you obtain from your connections with others) + (sum of
values you obtain from brokerage) (total cost of links created by you)
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The top part of the computer screen shows you the earnings that are decomposed into
the three parts:
• Benefits from being connected
• Brokerage rents
• Costs of linking
To give you a concrete idea of how each part of earnings is computed, let us take the
network on the right part of Figure 1. You are presented as Me.
First, observe that there is no path to two participants - P6 and P7: as you are not
connected to them, you obtain no benefit from them.
[Treatment Criticality only]
Second, you are connected to four participants P1, P2, P3 and P4 without any critical
participants. You obtain 10/2 = 5 points from each of these connections. You are also
connected to another participant, P5, and there is one critical participant, P4, between
you and P5. You obtain 10/3 = 3.3 points. Therefore, the benefits that you get from your
connections are
10
2
× 4 + 10
3
≈ 23.3
Third, observe that you are critical between P2 and each of the four participants P1,
P3, P4, and P5. So you obtain brokerage rents from these pairs. Specifically, you are the
only critical participant in three pairs (P2, P1), (P2, P3), and (P2, P4). In the pair (P2,
P5), you and P1 are both critical. The brokerage rents you obtain are
10
3
× 3 + 10
4
= 12.5
Recall that your payoff is only affected by the reciprocated links.
[Treatment Betweenness only]
Second, you are connected to three participants P2, P3 and P4 without any intermediary.
You obtain 10/2 = 5 points from each of these connections.
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You are connected to participant P1, through two participants P3 and P4, lying on
two distinct shortest paths, between you and P1. You and participant P1 each receive
10/(2+1) = 3.3 points. You are also connected to participant P5 through 3 intermediaries:
P3 and P4 lying on only one shortest path, and P1 lying on both shortest paths. You and
participant P5 each receive 10/(2 + 2) = 2.5 points. Therefore, the benefits that you get
from your connections are
5× 3 + 3.3 + 2.5 ≈ 20.8
Third, observe that you lie on all shortest paths between P2 and each of the four par-
ticipants P1, P3, P4, and P5. So you receive brokerage rents from these pairs (P2, P1),
(P2, P3), (P2, P4), and (P2, P5). You are the only intermediary for the pairs (P2,P3) and
(P2,P4) and therefore earns 3.3 points (≈ 10/(1 + 2)) for each.
Two other intermediaries (P3 and P4) are lying on a shortest path for the pair (P2,
P1). Since they each lie on only one of the two existing shortest paths, you earn 2.5 points
(= 10/(2 + 2)).
Similarly, there are three other intermediaries lying on a shortest path for the pair (P2,
P5): P3 and P4 lie on only one of the two shortest paths, and P1 lies on both of them (as
you do). As a result, you earn 2 points (= 10/(3 + 2)).
You also lie on one shortest path out of the two shortest paths between P3 and P4.
You therefore receive brokerage rents 1.7 points (≈ 10/(1 + 2)× 1/2) from this pair. The
total brokerage rents you obtain are
2× 3.3 + 2.5 + 2 + 1.7 ≈ 12.8
Recall that your payoff is only affected by the reciprocated links.
[Treatment Distance only]
Second, you are connected to three participants P2, P3 and P4 without any intermediary.
You obtain 10/2 = 5 points from each of these connections.
You are connected to participant P1, through two participants P3 and P4, lying on
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two distinct shortest paths, between you and P1. You and participant P1 each receive
(10− 3/2− 3/2)/2 = 3.5 points.
Finally, you are connected to participant P5 through 3 intermediaries: P3 and P4 lying
on only one shortest path, and P5 lying on both shortest paths. You and participant P5
each receive (10− 3/2− 3/2− 3)/2 = 2 points. Therefore, the benefits that you get from
your connections are
5× 3 + 3.5 + 2 ≈ 20.5
Third, observe that you lie on all shortest paths between P2 and each of the four
participants P1, P3, P4, and P5. So you receive brokerage rents (3 points) from these
pairs (P2, P1), (P2, P3), (P2, P4), and (P2, P5). You also lie on one shortest path out
of two shortest paths between P3 and P4. You therefore receive brokerage rents 1.5 points
(= 3/2) from this pair. The total brokerage rents you obtain are
3× 4 + 1.5 ≈ 13.5
Recall that your payoff is only affected by the reciprocated links.
D Network game interface
The decision making interface used in the experiment is similar across all treatments. More
specifically, Figure 21 illustrates a (fictitious) example of a subject’s computer screen in
Treatment Criticality. The top part of the screen depicts information about the timer
indicating how much time has lapsed in the current round (the timer turns red when payoffs
become effective, i.e., after 1 minute has passed), and a comprehensive description of the
subject’s own payoff. Information about payoffs include own benefits from own connections,
brokerage rents, the cost of linking, and the net earnings. The bottom part of the screen
shows detailed information about the network (the subject’s node is highlighted in yellow).
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Figure 21: Example of decision screen for Criticality Treatment
56
E Questionnaires
At the end of the experiment, subjects answered a set of surveys aiming at measuring
various types of individual differences. More precisely, incentivized measures of compre-
hension in network game, social preferences, and risk preferences were used. Finally non
incentivized personality measures were used before which subjects filled up a debriefing
questionnaire that includes demographics information.
E.1 Comprehension check
In order to assess the subjects’ comprehension of the network game played during the
experiment, we provided 6 questions, each of which with a unique correct answer. Each
correct answer was rewarded with 0.1 euro for the subject.
All the same 6 questions were used across all treatments. In all treatments, the correct
answers are “10 pts” to question 1, and “40 pts” to question 2, and “a randomly selected
moment in the last 5 mins” to question 3.
The following questions 3, 4, and 5 relate to best response behavior in forming a link in
some network. Correct answers are as follows: “P1” in question 4 (all treatments); “P1”
(hub of the left hand side star) in question 5 (all treatments); “P18” (only node connecting
the left and right component) for Criticality treatment, and “P1” (center of wheel on left
hand side) for Betweenness and Distance treatments in question 6.
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E.2 Social preferences
The social preferences measure was adapted from Andreoni and Miller [2002] and involved
a series of five money allocation tasks between the decision maker and some anonymous
external participants of another experiment at the LINEEX lab (corresponding payments
were therefore made to these external passive participants). The five tasks used in our
experiment were represented through sliders as shown in the following figure:
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Note however that each question was presented in a different screen, and the order
of presentation was randomized for every subject. Furthermore, 50 points were worth 1
euro both the subject, and the other anonymous external participant. Detailed instructions
provided to the subjects, as well as a screenshot highlighting one of the above five questions
are described below.
Instructions: You are asked to answer a series of 5 questions, each of which consists of
selecting an allocation of points that you most prefer between yourself and an anonymous
randomly selected person who is participating to a different experiment in this lab. At
the end of the study, we will randomly select your allocation for 1 of the 5 questions to
determine the payments for both you and the other person in this part. Your decisions will
remain unknown to the other persons you are matched with.
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E.3 Risk preferences
The risk preference measure was adapted from Holt and Laury [2002] and consisted of a
series of five binary choices between lotteries, presented as in the figure below.
E.4 Personality test
Non incentivized measures were used through a simplified version of the Big Five person-
ality inventory test adapted from Rammstedt and John [2007], as shown below.
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